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Abstract
Gift-giving customs are ubiquitous in social, political, and business life. Legal
regulation and industry guidelines for gifts are often based on the assumption that
large gifts have the potential to influence behavior and create conflicts of interest,
but small gifts do not. However, scientific evidence on the impact of small gifts
on business relationships is scarce. We conducted a controlled field experiment in
collaboration with sales agents of a multinational consumer products company to
study the influence of small gifts on the outcome of business negotiations. We find
that small gifts matter. On average, sales representatives generate more than twice
as much revenue when they distribute a small gift at the onset of their negotiations.
However, we also find that small gifts tend to be counterproductive when purchasing
and sales agents meet for the first time, underlining that the nature of the business
relationship crucially aﬀects the profitability of gifts.
JEL classification: D63, C93
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Trust not their presents
Virgil, The Aeneid
1 Introduction
Gifts are commonly used to cultivate social and economic relationships (Waldfogel 1993;
Cialdini 1985; Mauss 1967). For example, the pharmaceutical industry spends billions
of dollars every year on gifts for health care professionals (Gagnon and Lexchin 2008;
Weintraub 2007; Wazana 2000). These gifts range from travel funding and free lunch
to drug samples and penlights (Campbell et al. 2007). Similarly, public oﬃcials often
receive unsolicited gifts or free food and beverages from lobbyists and special interest
groups (Susman 2008). The ethical appropriateness of these practices and their potential
to create conflicts of interest is intensively debated, as the lines between gifts and bribes
are often not clear-cut (Fisher 2007; Katz et al. 2003; Fain 2002; Rose-Ackerman 1998;
McCracken and Callahan 1996). Commonly implemented regulatory practices are so-
called de minimis rules, which allow the acceptance of gifts up to a certain threshold
value. For example, more than half of the US states have implemented a de minimis rule
for legislators, with thresholds ranging from 10 US dollars per year in Arizona to 500 US
dollars in Texas (see NCSL 2014).1 The implicit assumption behind these policies and
guidelines is that while expensive gifts potentially influence behavior, small gifts do not.
However, scholars in anthropology and social psychology argue that gifts, irrespective
of their value, can impose strong feelings of indebtedness and create an obligation to
reciprocate with even larger favors (Cialdini 1985; Mauss 1967; Gouldner 1960). These
concerns have led critics to urge organizations to adopt a zero gift policy rather than de
minimis rules (Katz et al. 2003; Fain 2002). Despite its policy relevance, the impact of
small gifts on business relationships remains largely unexplored.
1The industry guidelines of the American Medical Association restricts gifts worth more than 100
US dollar (see Grande 2010).
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This paper presents a controlled field experiment that tests the impact of small gifts
on the outcome of business negotiations. The experiment was conducted in collaboration
with a group of sales representatives of a large multinational consumer products company
located in Switzerland. The sales agents visited 220 drug stores and pharmacies to sell
beauty and health care products and distributed a small gift to a random subset of
potential buyers at the beginning of their sales negotiations. The gift consisted of a
sample of six tubes of toothpaste costing less than 10 US dollars.
The results show that even a small gift can have a substantial influence on the success
of sales negotiations. The sales representatives generate, on average, more than twice as
much revenue when they hand over the toothpaste at the beginning of their sales nego-
tiation. The treatment eﬀect is even larger for sales negotiations with store managers:
In this case, gifts increase sales revenue by more than 300 percent. Overall, the sales
boost is large enough to render gift-giving a profitable strategy for the firm. However,
we also find that the impact of gift-giving crucially depends on the nature of the business
relationship between trading partners: When the sales agents negotiate with a potential
buyer they meet for the first time, the gift tends to hamper negotiations and reduces
revenue.
Our field experiment makes several contributions to the literature. First, a substan-
tial amount of evidence from laboratory experiments documents that reciprocal behavior
is widespread: People respond to kind or hostile actions likewise, even if reciprocating is
costly and yields no future benefits.2 More recently, an active debate emerged, question-
ing the extent to which laboratory results are generalizable to naturally occurring market
settings (see DellaVigna 2009; Falk and Heckmann 2009; and Levitt and List 2007). In
our field experiment, the purchasing agents did not know they were participating in an
experiment. Therefore, social desirability eﬀects did not aﬀect their behavior, which
2See Fehr and Gächter (2000) for an overview. A related emerging literature studies bribing and
reciprocity in laboratory settings (e.g., Gneezy et al. 2015; Malmendier and Schmidt 2012; Abbink et al.
2002).
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could overstate the importance of prosocial behavior in laboratory settings (Levitt and
List 2007). Moreover, the study was integrated into the daily routine of the sales agents
and therefore allowed them to behave naturally. In contrast to the usual student subject
pool in lab experiments, we analyze the behavior of experienced market participants who
are familiar with the commonly used persuasion tactics in the sales business.3 We thus
contribute to the growing literature on gift exchange in the field (e.g., DellaVigna et al.
2016; Esteves-Sorenson and Macera 2015; Cohn et al. 2014a,b; Kube et al. 2013, 2012;
Bellemare and Shearer 2009; Gneezy and List 2006). Most studies focus on monetary
gift exchange in the labor market and study whether workers reciprocate higher wages
with more eﬀort.4 Falk (2007) analyzes gift-exchange in a non-market context and finds
that enclosing gifts in solicitation letters increases charitable giving. In an audit study
conducted in Chinese hospitals, Currie et al. (2013) demonstrate that gifts from patients
to physicians reduce the prescription of unnecessary antibiotics and increase service qual-
ity, even for third parties associated with the gift giver. List (2006) conducted a field
experiment at a sports cards fair and shows that customers who make higher prices of-
fers receive cards of better quality in return. However, the results also indicate that this
relationship holds only when third parties can verify quality. Kirchler and Palan (2015)
study the eﬀect of tipping and verbal compliments on service quality in Turkish fast food
restaurants. In contrast to the previous literature, we study the impact of gift-giving in
a business-to-business context.
Second, our results relate to the theoretical literature studying the origins and motives
of gift-giving. The prevalence of in-kind gift-giving is puzzling from a standard economic
point of view, as cash transfers are in general more eﬃcient than non-monetary gifts,
which might be of low or no value to the recipient (see Waldfogel 1993). Several theo-
3See Williams et al. (2004) for evidence that knowledge of persuasive intentions can reduce the
susceptibility to persuasion.
4Kube et al. (2012) compare monetary and non-monetary gifts and find that non-monetary gifts
results in stronger reciprocal reactions than a corresponding cash gift, suggesting that the nature of the
gift matters.
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ries propose that in-kind gifts can be used to signal one’s intention to invest in future
relationships (Sozou and Seymour 2005; Bolle 2001; Carmichael and MacLeod 1997;
Camerer 1988).5 According to these theories, gifts should be especially eﬀective when
used to initiate new business relations. Our results, however, do not support this con-
jecture. While gifts foster sales in established business relations, they do not generate
more revenue in negotiations with prospective customers—if anything, they tend to be
counterproductive.
Third, our paper also relates to the common marketing practice of distributing free
samples (see e.g. Cialdini 1985). However, there is astonishingly little evidence on the
impact of free product samples on sales (Bawa and Shoemaker 2004). Moreover, the
existing literature has mainly focused on product familiarization and learning eﬀects
associated with trying product samples.6 In our experiment, purchasing decisions are
made on the spot, leaving the buyer no time to sample the gift. Therefore, our results
cannot be explained by learning or product familiarization.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we describe
the experimental setting and design. We report the experimental results in Section 3.
In Section 4, we conclude with a discussion of the findings.
2 Experimental Setting and Design
Experimental Setting
We conducted the field experiment in collaboration with a Swiss subsidiary of a large
multinational consumer goods company. More specifically, the experiment involved a
5See Ellingsen and Johannesson (2011), Kaplan and Ruﬄe (2009), and Prendergast and Stole (2001)
for further theoretical accounts of non-monetary gift-giving.
6Lammers (1991), Steinberg and Yalch (1978), and Scott (1976) provide field evidence concerning
the impact of free samples on purchasing behavior. In one of the rare field experiments focusing on
reciprocity in the business to consumer context, Strohmetz et al. (2002) find that distributing a small
piece of chocolate with the check significantly increased the tips given to the servers in a restaurant.
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group of five sales representatives (three males and two females) who were responsible
for beauty and health care products (e.g., shower gels, body lotions, deodorants, etc.).
All of them have long work experience in the sales business. They work in diﬀerent
regions, covering the entire Swiss market. The representatives are paid a fixed wage,
without any explicit performance incentives. Their main task is to visit and cultivate
relationships with the firm’s customers, who are purchasing agents or managers of retail
shops, ranging from small independent stores to branches of large retail chains. The field
experiment involved a subset of those retail shops, namely drug stores and pharmacies.
We study only a subset of the firm’s customers for two reasons: (i) it ensured a suﬃciently
large number of potential sales negotiations with a relatively homogenous set of stores
and products, and (ii) the purchasing agents of these stores do not face any restrictions
with respect to the receipt of free product samples. Customers are categorized into five
diﬀerent levels of sales potential, ranging from A (highest sales potential) to E (lowest
potential). This ranking is based on the sales agents’ subjective assessment, and it
is updated regularly. The purpose of the ranking is to provide guidance for the sales
agents on how much time and eﬀort they should invest in the relationship with a specific
customer. We use this ranking in our regression analysis to control for diﬀerences in
previous buying propensities between stores.
In the design stage of the field experiment, we surveyed the sales representatives
about their sales strategies and routines. They regularly visit customers to present new
oﬀers and special promotions. The frequency of visits depends on the customer ranking,
while the sequence of visits on a given day is determined by geographical proximity.
The sales representatives usually drop in without prior notice and try to address the
manager of the retail store. In case the manager is busy or absent, they speak to
another staﬀ member. In most cases, the manager also owns the store. The purchasing
agents and sales agents often know each other personally, but sales agents occasionally
visit prospective customers to enlarge their customer base. Every sales representative
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is equipped with a folder containing product oﬀers. The majority of the oﬀers are
new products or special promotions of existing products. In case a purchasing agent is
interested in a product, the sales representatives take the orders instantaneously using a
form from their sales folder. Sales negotiations typically last ten to fifteen minutes.
We were particularly interested in one aspect of sales strategies, namely their gift-
giving practices. All sales representatives had previously used product samples as gifts
in their business negotiations. However, these gifts were used rather infrequently and
they were almost always handed over after a successful deal. A small independent survey
which we conducted with employees and managers (n = 32) from diﬀerent drug stores
and pharmacies confirmed this. Except for two respondents, all have received gifts from
sales agents in the past, and 90 percent of the respondents indicate that they typically
received gifts after the sales meeting. The purchasing agents thus should not expect to
receive any gift at the beginning of the negotiation.
Experimental Design
Two weeks before the experiment, the sales agents attended a briefing led by one of
the authors. We explicitly told the sales agents that their data would not be used for
individual performance comparisons and that all data would be anonymized.
After a short introduction, they received detailed instructions about the procedures
of the experiment. Each sales rep received a folder containing numbered sheets of paper
for upcoming sales negotiations. Each sheet contained a text box with the instructions
for the corresponding negotiation. In particular, the instructions indicated the treatment
condition for the next sales pitch: In the “Gift” treatment, sales agents had to hand over
six tubes of toothpaste as a “free sample product from the firm” right at the beginning
of their negotiations. The value of the gift was roughly 10 Swiss francs in total (or
7.7 US dollars at the time of the experiment). We chose a gift of similar value to
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those the sales agents had previously used. In addition, we made sure that the gift is
equally attractive to men and women. In the control treatment, the sales agents did
not distribute any gift. The sequence of the treatments in each sales agent’s folder
was randomly determined in advance and they were instructed to work through the
folder sheet by sheet without skipping a sheet or changing the order. During the field
experiment, all sellers were equipped with the same sales folders containing five special
oﬀers.7 Apart from the treatment manipulation, the sales agents were instructed to
follow their usual negotiation routines. We purposely did not restrict their behavior and
refrained from using a fixed protocol to keep the situation as natural as possible. The
within sales agent randomization allows us to control for diﬀerences in negotiation style
between the sales agents by controlling for agent fixed eﬀects.
In addition to the instructions, the sheets also contained a short survey, which pro-
vides the data for our analysis. The first part of the survey was filled out before each sales
negotiation and asked for (i) the customer category (A, B, C, D or E), and (ii) whether
the customer was being visited for the first time. Immediately after the sales meeting
the sales agents filled out the second part of the survey, containing (iii) the number of
oﬀers they were able to show to the purchasing agent (as a proxy for attention), (iv)
the sales revenue they generated for each of the five oﬀers, (v) the duration of the sales
negotiation, and (vi) whether they negotiated with the store manager or with someone
from the regular staﬀ.
The last part of the briefing consisted of mock sales negotiations. In order to acquaint
all of the sales agents with the experimental procedures, each of them went through a
hypothetical sales negotiation and filled out the survey. Every sales agent was identified
through a code, which preserved anonymity. The data collection spanned over two
months. Customers were only visited once during the experiment. We were able to
7We used several sets of sales folders in order to test various modes of product presentation, which
were primarily in the interest of the firm. Treatment Gift and the diﬀerent forms of product presentation
were orthogonal by design.
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collect data from a total of 220 sales negotiations; 109 in the Gift treatment and 111 in
the control treatment.
3 Experimental Results
Empirical strategy
We start our analysis by performing a randomization check. None of the background
characteristics is significantly diﬀerent between the two treatments—except for the dummy
variables “Customer category E” (p = 0:008, 2 test) and “Noon” (p = 0:085, 2 test).8
We control for time of the day and customer category fixed eﬀects in all regressions.
Table A1 in the Appendix provides descriptive statistics and the p-values for all back-
ground characteristics. We conclude that the randomization was successful and resulted
in a well-balanced set of observations across treatments.
We estimate the following linear model using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS):
(1) Yit = i + Gift it + Xit + Tit + it;
where Yit is either the total sales revenue or a dummy variable indicating positive sales
revenue for sales agent i at time t. Gift it is a binary treatment variable. We include
individual fixed eﬀects i that capture diﬀerences in negotiation style between sales
agents. The results are qualitatively robust if we estimate a Tobit model with bottom
censoring at zero sales revenue instead. We also include customer category fixed eﬀects
(Xit) in order to control for diﬀerences in sales potential between stores. In addition,
we control for time of the day and month fixed eﬀects (Tit). Managers have potentially
more authority to make acquisition decisions than the regular staﬀ. Moreover, regular
8We report two-sided p-values throughout the text.
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staﬀ members might not have kept the gift for themselves and instead handed it over to
their manager. To allow for diﬀerent reactions to the gift between managers and regular
staﬀ, we extend the baseline model by including a dummy for negotiations with the store
managers and the corresponding interaction term with the Gift treatment.
The influence of gift-giving on sales
Panel (a) of Figure 1 shows that the gift has a substantial positive influence on sales
revenue. On average, sales agents more than double their sales revenue when they hand
over the gift at the beginning of their negotiations. Panel (b) shows that the treatment
eﬀect is more pronounced when the sales agents negotiate with the store managers: sales
revenue increase, on average, from 61 to 271 Swiss francs. In contrast, the gift has no
impact when the recipients of the gift are regular employees: average sales revenue is
45.3 in treatment Gift and 46.4 Swiss Francs in the control condition (see panel c). The
regression results reported in Table 1 underpin these findings statistically. Columns (1)
and (2) illustrate that treatment Gift significantly increases sales revenue irrespective of
whether or not we control for store categories, time of the day, and month fixed eﬀects
in addition to the sales agent fixed eﬀects (p = 0:023, respectively p = 0:033).
Column (3) illustrates that the eﬀect is mainly driven by the negotiations with the
store managers. The coeﬃcient estimate for treatment Gift is close to zero and statisti-
cally insignificant (p = 0:945), suggesting that the gift does not influence sales revenue
when the sales agents negotiate with the regular staﬀ. On the other hand, the interac-
tion eﬀect “Gift  manager” is large and significant (p = 0:019). Sales revenue increases
by roughly 190 Swiss francs, on average, when the sales agents hand over the gift at
the beginning of the negotiations with the store managers (p = 0:015, Wald test). A
potential explanation for the diﬀerent reactions of the managers and regular staﬀ is that
managers have much more leeway in their purchasing decisions than regular staﬀ. Al-
ternatively, it is also possible that the regular staﬀ members are less likely to keep the
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Figure 1: Small Gifts Lubricate Sales Negotiations
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This figure shows the average sales revenue in treatment Gift and the control condition. Panel (a) is
based on the full sample of negotiations (N = 220). In panel (b), the sample is restricted to negotiations
with the store managers (n = 77), and panel (c) is based on the sub-sample of negotiations with the
regular staﬀ (n = 143). Error bars represent standard error (adjusted for clustering on the level of sales
agents) of the mean.
gift for themselves and instead hand it over to their managers. Our independent survey
also supports this view: While virtually all respondents in manager positions use gifts
and samples for private purposes, only 38 percent of the regular staﬀ indicate that they
keep gifts for themselves.
Is the gift a profitable strategy from the perspective of the firm? On average, the
gift increases revenue by 66 Swiss francs. Whether this renders the gift profitable or not
depends on the firm’s profit margin. A profit margin as low as 16 percent would suﬃce to
make the gift of ten Swiss francs profitable on average. We do not have exact information
about the profit margin, but according to personal communication with employees of the
firm, we know that it clearly surpasses this threshold. When dealing with a manager, the
coeﬃcient estimates add up to roughly 190 Swiss francs. In this case, a profit margin as
low as 5.3 percent would suﬃce for the firm to break even. Moreover, the lower bound
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Table 1: Regression Results: Sales revenue
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable: Sales revenue in Swiss francs
Gift 78.939 66.292 1.475 62.993 -2.694
(34.666) (31.059) (21.292) (30.506) (21.581)
Gift  manager 188.435 183.794
(80.288) (79.133)
Manager 17.574 30.350
(28.918) (30.620)
# Oﬀers shown 11.006 18.764
(7.367) (9.350)
Additional controls?
Sale agent FE yes yes yes yes yes
Customer category FE yes yes yes yes
Time of day FE yes yes yes yes
Month FE yes yes yes yes
Observations 220 220 220 220 220
2 47.151 46.122 59.195 45.877 58.539
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
This table reports OLS coeﬃcient estimates (bootstrapped standard errors using 1000 draws in paren-
theses). The dependent variable is the total sales revenue generated during the negotiation. “Gift” is
a dummy variable for treatment Gift. “Manager” is a dummy indicating that the sales rep negotiated
with the store manager. The interaction term “Gift  manager” allows the treatment eﬀect to diﬀer
between negotiations with the store managers and regular staﬀ. “# Oﬀers shown” indicates how many
of the five special oﬀers could be shown to the purchasing agent during the negotiations. All regressions
include sales agent fixed eﬀects (FE). Regressions in column (2)-(5) include additional fixed eﬀects for
customer categories A to E (as a proxy for sales potential), time of the day, and month. Significance
levels are denoted as follows:  p < 0.10,  p < 0.05,  p < 0.01.
of the 95 percent confidence interval for “Gift manager” is 31 Swiss Francs, which is
still well above the cost of the gift. Taken together, the results strongly suggest that the
gift increases the profitability of sales negotiations.
The gift could have boosted sales indirectly by attracting the purchasing agents’
attention. We measure attention by counting how many of the five special oﬀers from
the sales booklet the sales agents were actually able to present to the purchasing agents in
a given negotiation. The average number of oﬀers shown is 3.79 in the control treatment
and 4.16 in treatment Gift. To investigate the extent to which greater attention explains
the eﬀect of the gift on sales revenue, we include the number of oﬀers shown in column
(4) and (5) of Table 1. The coeﬃcient of “# Oﬀers shown” in column (4) is statistically
insignificant (p = 0:135), but becomes significant in column 5, where we include the
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interaction term between treatment Gift and meetings with store managers (p = 0:045).
Nevertheless, the coeﬃcient estimates of “Gift” in column (4) and “Gift  manager” in
column (5) remain almost unchanged in magnitude and statistical significance. These
results suggest that the gift influenced sales performance independent of attention eﬀects.
We further investigate whether the observed increase in sales revenue is due a higher
sales likelihood or whether customers who receive a gift also placed larger orders—
i.e., we compare the influence of the gift at the extensive and intensive margin. For
this purpose, we estimate a linear probability model according to equation (1) using a
dummy variable which indicates positive sales revenue as dependent variable. Column 1
in Table 2 suggests that overall the gift did not significantly influence the probability
of making a deal (p = 0:631). However, column (2) illustrates that the gift has a
Table 2: Regression Results: Extensive and intensive margin
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable: Sale = 1 Sales revenue
Gift 0.028 -0.055 169.904
(0.058) (0.068) (83.172)
Gift  manager 0.241
(0.119)
Manager 0.016
Additional controls?
Sale agent FE yes yes yes
Customer category FE yes yes yes
Time of day FE yes yes yes
Month FE yes yes yes
Observations 220 220 73
2 223.337 232.947 59.675
p 0.000 0.000 0.000
This table reports OLS coeﬃcient estimates (bootstrapped standard errors using 1000 draws in paren-
theses). The dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is a dummy variable indicating positive sales
revenue. In column (3), the dependent variable is the total sales revenue generated during the negoti-
ation. “Gift” is a dummy variable for treatment Gift. “Manager” is a dummy indicating that the sales
rep negotiated with the store manager. The interaction term “Gift  manager” allows the treatment
eﬀect to diﬀer between negotiations with the store managers and regular staﬀ. All regressions include
fixed eﬀects for sales agent, customer categories A to E (as a proxy for sales potential), time of the day,
and month. In column (3), the sample is restricted to observations with a positive revenue. Significance
levels are denoted as follows:  p < 0.10,  p < 0.05,  p < 0.01.
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significantly stronger impact on the negotiations with the store managers (p = 0:043).
On average, the gift increases sales probability in negotiations with store managers by
18.6 percentage points (p = 0:066, Wald test). In Column (3), we measure the impact of
the gift on the intensive margin. For this purpose, we restrict the sample to observations
positive sales revenue. The results show that treatment Gift has a sizable impact on the
intensive margin. Conditional on a sale, the gift increases revenue by approximately 170
Swiss francs (p = 0:041).
The role of relationships
The sales agents often know their customers personally from previous visits. However,
they occasionally negotiate with purchasing agents they have never met before. This
allows us to investigate whether the eﬀect of the gift depends on the nature of the
relationship between the sales agents and purchasing agents. Interestingly, the gift tends
to be counterproductive when customers and sellers meet for the first time (N = 82):
while the average sales revenue in the control treatment is 23.5 Swiss francs, it is only half
the size in treatment Gift (11.1 Swiss francs). The regression results in columns (1) and
(2) of Table 3 provide statistical support for this finding: the coeﬃcient of the “Gift 
first visit” interaction term is significantly negative, irrespective whether we additionally
control for customer categories, time of the day and month fixed eﬀects (p = 0:005).
Adding up the coeﬃcient estimates for “Gift” and “Gift  first visit” yields a negative
net treatment eﬀect for negotiations with prospective customers, but the eﬀect does not
reach statistical significance (2 test: p = 0:364 and p = 0:294, respectively).9 Hence,
our results suggest that the influence of gifts is restricted to negotiations where there is
some degree of familiarity between the sales and purchasing agent.
9One of the sales agents was newly hired during the period of the experiment and therefore did not
know any of the buyers personally. This seller’s revenue is on average lower in treatment Gift than in
the control condition. The opposite holds true for all other sales representatives. The results are robust
if we exclude observations from this newly hired employee.
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Table 3: Regression Results: First visits
(1) (2)
Dependent variable: Sales revenue in Swiss francs
Gift 130.912 123.072
(50.791) (48.183)
Gift  first visit -146.373 -144.456
(51.821) (51.852)
First visit -24.784 26.094
(31.425) (32.689)
Additional controls?
Sale rep FE yes yes
Customer category FE yes
Time of day FE yes
Month FE yes
Observations 220 220
2 54.231 48.565
p 0.000 0.000
This table reports OLS coeﬃcient estimates (bootstrapped standard errors using 1000 draws in paren-
theses). The dependent variable is the total sales revenue generated during the negotiation. “Gift” is a
dummy variable for treatment Gift. “First visit” is a dummy indicating that the sales rep visited the
purchasing agent for the first time. The interaction term “Gift  first visit” allows the treatment eﬀect
to diﬀer between negotiations where the sales rep and purchasing agent met for the first time or where
they know each other. All regressions include sales agent fixed eﬀects (FE). The regression in column
(2) includes additional fixed eﬀects for customer categories A to E (as a proxy for sales potential), time
of the day, and month. Significance levels are denoted as follows:  p < 0.10,  p < 0.05,  p < 0.01.
4 Discussion and Concluding Remarks
We conducted a natural field experiment to test whether small gifts lubricate business
negotiations. Sales representatives of a multinational consumer products company ran-
domly distributed a small gift to their trading partners at the onset of their negotiations.
The small gift substantially increases sales revenue, especially when the gift is handed
over to the store manager. Our study focuses on the immediate eﬀects of a one-time
gift. An interesting next step would be to look at the long term eﬀects and repeated
gift-giving. For example, it is conceivable that the gift has positive carryover eﬀects on
future sales. Once a new product has made it into the product shelf, the store manager
might keep it there and place follow up orders. On the other hand, the gift might also
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have negative carryover eﬀects: If the purchasing agents in the Gift treatment decrease
their expenditures in subsequent sales negotiations without gifts, the long term eﬀect of
the gift might be smaller. Although our data does not allow to test for carryover eﬀects,
previous gift-exchange studies suggest that intertemporal substitution is of second order
importance (see Kirchler and Palan 2015; Bellemare and Shearer 2009; Falk 2007).
Our results also indicate that the influence of gifts on sales negotiations crucially de-
pends on the relationship between business partners. When the sales agents and the cus-
tomer meet for the first time and therefore do not know each other, gifts do not increase
sales on average. On the contrary, they even tend to hinder sales agents’ performance.
One potential explanation for this phenomenon is that the nature of the relationship de-
termines how recipients perceive gifts and the underlying intentions. When sales agents
and purchasing agents know each other, a gift can be seen as a gesture of friendship
or a thank you for the good relationship in the past. On the other hand, prospective
customers may become suspicious and consider the gift as a persuasive attempt to push
sales or even as a bribe. Trawick et al. (1989) conducted a survey among purchasing
agents and found that gifts are considered to be less ethical and to negatively aﬀect
supplier choice if they are distributed to prospective instead of existing customers. An-
other possible explanation for the absence of reciprocal behavior relates to the concept
of social distance (e.g. Hoﬀman et al. 1996;Charness et al. 2007). Buyers might perceive
the social distance to be greater when dealing with an unknown customer and therefore
feel less indebted to reciprocate.10
Our results are consistent with lab experimental evidence of gift-exchange and reci-
procity in one-shot situations. However, it is also conceivable that the purchasing agents
interpret the situation as a repeated game, and therefore respond to the gift strategically,
i.e., they spend more in order to receive additional gifts in the future. In fact, our results
10Interestingly, Bellemare and Shearer (2009) find that reciprocal behavior is more pronounced in their
labor market field experiment, as the workers’ tenure increases. It therefore seems that the interaction
between the giver-responder relationship and reciprocal motivation is not restricted to the specific setting
of this study.
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that the regular staﬀ and prospective customers—who might be less likely to perceive
the situation as a repeated game—do not respond to the gift, appear to be consistent
with a strategic form of reciprocity. On the other hand, given the marginal value of
the gift in relation to the costs of shelf and storage space, we think it is unlikely that
strategic considerations alone would produce such a strong increase in sales revenue.11
To conclude, our findings underscore that even small gifts can distort the outcome
of sales negotiations. The eﬀect of the gift is surprisingly sizeable given that our set-
ting involves experienced market professionals who themselves use persuasive marketing
techniques in their daily business. Furthermore, the managers in our experiment are typ-
ically the owner of the business and bear the full consequences of their buying decisions.
The eﬀect of the gift could be even larger in more typical bribing situations where the
decision maker receives the gift but the consequences of his actions are borne by third
parties.12 Therefore, the definition of gifts as bribes and their potential role in shaping
conflicts of interest should not be based on the value of gifts alone.
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Appendix
Table A1: Descriptive statistics and randomization check
Total sample Gift Control
N = 220 n = 109 n = 111
Variable mean sd mean sd mean sd p-value
Male 0.255 0.437 0.284 0.453 0.225 0.420 0.314
Manager 0.350 0.478 0.358 0.482 0.342 0.477 0.810
First visit 0.373 0.485 0.367 0.484 0.378 0.487 0.861
# Visits 1.973 2.532 2.220 2.773 1.730 2.256 0.243
Customer category A 0.055 0.228 0.064 0.246 0.045 0.208 0.531
Customer category B 0.205 0.404 0.229 0.422 0.180 0.386 0.366
Customer category C 0.409 0.493 0.450 0.500 0.369 0.485 0.227
Customer category D 0.059 0.236 0.064 0.246 0.054 0.227 0.749
Customer category E 0.273 0.446 0.193 0.396 0.351 0.480 0.008
Store in shopping mall 0.286 0.453 0.294 0.458 0.279 0.451 0.815
Morning (8am-12pm) 0.550 0.499 0.550 0.500 0.550 0.500 0.989
Noon (12pm-2pm) 0.118 0.324 0.156 0.364 0.081 0.274 0.085
Afternoon (2pm-7pm) 0.332 0.472 0.294 0.458 0.369 0.485 0.233
January 0.495 0.501 0.505 0.502 0.486 0.502 0.788
Sales agent 1 0.059 0.236 0.064 0.246 0.054 0.227 0.749
Sales agent 2 0.227 0.420 0.229 0.422 0.225 0.420 0.942
Sales agent 3 0.405 0.492 0.376 0.487 0.432 0.498 0.395
Sales agent 4 0.264 0.442 0.284 0.453 0.243 0.431 0.488
Sales agent 5 0.045 0.209 0.046 0.210 0.045 0.208 0.977
This table reports means and standard deviations (in parentheses) in the total sample and in treatment Gift and Control.
The last column displays p-values for the null hypothesis of perfect randomization (2 tests in case of binary variables
and Mann-Whitney tests in case of interval variables). “Male” is a gender dummy. “Manager” is a dummy indicating
that the sales rep negotiated with the store manager. “First visit” is a dummy indicating that the sales rep visited the
purchasing agent for the first time. “# Visits” is the number of times the store has been visited since the first of January
2005. “Customer category” A to E are dummy variables indicating in which category a store falls. Where “A” customers
are the most important and “E” customers the least important customers. This ranking is subjective and is based on the
sales potential. “Morning”, “Noon”, and “Afternoon” are dummy variables indicating the time of the day. “January” is a
dummy for sales negotiations in January. “Sales agent” 1 to 5 are dummies identifying the diﬀerent sales agents.
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